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PUTTING THE GUESSWORK BACK INTO 
CAPITAL SENTENCING 
Sean D. O’Brien* †
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-
testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of 
[the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is 
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” 
Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court 
to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast 
thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-
tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the 
Court’s concerns focused on race, class, and fairness in the imposition of the 
ultimate punishment.  
Four years later, Gregg v. Georgia cautiously put the executioner back in 
business, conditioned upon a system of guided discretion designed to mini-
mize the death penalty’s arbitrary and discriminatory inclinations. On the 
same day it decided Gregg, the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina held 
that a reasoned, moral response to any crime required consideration of the 
unique circumstances of each offender, and struck down statutes that pro-
vided for the automatic imposition of the death penalty for defendants 
convicted of murder. It thus made individualized consideration of the back-
ground and character of the accused “a constitutionally indispensable part of 
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Further, because of the enor-
mous implications of erroneously taking a human life, the Court found a 
strong constitutional “need for reliability in the determination that death is 
the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” The Court then, in Godfrey v. 
Georgia, cautioned that “if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it 
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that 
avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.” 
The Court’s decision last term in Kansas v. Marsh appears to deviate 
from the Eighth Amendment protections insisted upon by Furman’s prog-
eny. In Marsh, the Court responded to a Kansas Supreme Court decision 
invalidating a capital sentencing statute that required jurors to impose a 
death sentence even if they were unable to decide whether mitigating cir-
cumstances outweighed aggravating factors. In a previous case, State v. 
Kleypas, the Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the statute to mean that 
 
 * Director, Public Interest Litigation Clinic; Visiting Professor, University of Missouri-
Kansas City School of Law. 
 † Suggested citation: Sean D. O’Brien, Putting the Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentenc-
ing, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 90 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/ 
firstimpressions/vol105/obrien.pdf. 
O'BRIEN FI PAGINATED.DOC 10/20/2006 4:00 PM 
2006] Putting the Guesswork Back 91 
 
A remarkable aspect of Marsh is that even though the case was strictly 
about capital sentencing, the issue of executing the innocent dominated the 
opinions of five justices. On its face, Marsh had nothing to do with inno-
cence. Nevertheless, four justices expressed concerns about the wisdom of 
reducing constitutional barriers to execution at a time when DNA technol-
ogy is exonerating death row inmates in unprecedented numbers. Justice 
Souter wrote, “We cannot face up to these facts and still hold that the guar-
“in doubtful cases the jury must return a sentence of death,” regardless of 
any mitigating aspect of the defendant’s background, character or circum-
stances of the offense. By “doubtful case[],” the court meant one in which 
the jury “could not fairly come to a conclusion about what balance existed 
between [aggravating and mitigating circumstances].” If the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances cancel one another out, the court reasoned, then 
the resulting death sentence cannot be the product of guided discretion. In 
such circumstances, the risk is unacceptably high that arbitrary factors, such 
as race and class, will influence the outcome. Kleypas attempted to construe 
the statute to avoid the constitutional issue, as state courts had done with 
similar statutes in Idaho, Montana, and New Jersey. The Kansas Supreme 
Court in Marsh had decided that this issue was more appropriately left to the 
legislature to write a constitutional sentencing formula, as the Colorado Su-
preme Court had done with a nearly identical statute.  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, overturned the 
Kansas court’s decision, over the dissent of Justice Stevens, who warned 
that “[n]othing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of the 
death penalty in [Kansas] justified this Court’s exercise of its discretion to 
review the judgment of the [Kansas] Supreme Court.” Justice Stevens’s con-
cern that Marsh is the product of judicial activism is easy to understand. At 
the heart of Justice Thomas’s opinion is a rejection of the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of its own state’s statute. The Court found that the 
state court was simply wrong to conclude that “an equipoise determination 
reflects juror confusion or inability to decide between life and death, or that 
a jury may use equipoise as a loophole to shirk its constitutional duty to 
render a reasoned, moral decision.” This seems at odds with the respect 
owed to the Kansas Supreme Court as the ultimate expositor of state law. 
In addition to running roughshod over the Kansas Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of its own law, the Court overlooked express waivers by the 
State in order to reach the Eighth Amendment issue. In its brief in the state 
court, Kansas agreed that Marsh’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, 
and conceded that Kleypas was correctly decided. When the Kansas Su-
preme Court relied on Kleypas to invalidate the statute altogether, the 
Attorney General moved for rehearing, but still did not challenge Kleypas. 
The issue on which the Supreme Court overturned the Kansas Supreme 
Court was raised for the first time in the petition for certiorari. In virtually 
any other context, the Court would have denied review because of the peti-
tioner’s disrespect for the Kansas Supreme Court and its processes. Justice 
Stevens’s fears about the Court’s apparent desire to facilitate executions are 
well-grounded.  
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On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court must look to its own Constitu-
tion for guidance on what to do with this morally troubling statute. In 
Kleypas, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence to interpret Kansas’s Bill of Rights, which prohibits “cruel or 
unusual punishment.” That is understandable, given the dearth of modern 
death penalty law in Kansas, and the fact that federal cases at the time suffi-
ciently respected the human dignity of the accused by requiring a moral, 
reliable determination that death is the appropriate punishment. There are, 
however, compelling reasons to find that the Kansas Constitution provides 
defendants greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. The Michigan Su-
antee of morally justifiable sentencing is hollow enough to allow maximiz-
ing death sentences, by requiring them when juries fail to find the worst 
degree of culpability: when, by a State’s own standards and a State’s own 
characterization, the case for death is ‘doubtful.’ ” While Justice Scalia at-
tempted to manipulate the number of death row innocents to a statistically 
insignificant minimum, even he conceded that the possibility of executing 
an innocent person “is a truism, not a revelation.” 
Equally notable about Marsh is that, aside from two passing references 
to the Eighth Amendment’s mandate of “guided discretion,” there is no dis-
cussion of the Eighth Amendment concerns that were at the heart of both 
Furman and Kleypas. Not even the dissenters addressed the obvious prob-
lem that the Kansas statute increases the risk of death sentences based on 
race, religion, class, or other impermissible factors. Marsh is a clear sign 
that this Court intends to diminish constitutional protection against arbitrary 
and discriminatory death sentences. The Marsh dissent, on the other hand, 
suggests that the growing awareness of the risk of executing the innocent 
may have awakened new reservations about the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. Whether this will lead to a constitutional showdown over the death 
penalty in some future case remains to be seen. In the meantime, the duty 
falls upon the Kansas Supreme Court to decide what to do with the uniquely 
harsh Kansas death penalty statute. 
The Kansas Supreme Court is not finished with this case. After explic-
itly finding that a death sentence imposed under this statute cannot be 
viewed as a reasoned, moral response to the offender or the crime, the court 
would be wrong to abdicate its responsibility to the United States Supreme 
Court. As the plurality stated in Trop v. Dulles, the Eighth Amendment 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.” In recent years, it has been up to the 
states to exercise leadership in placing reasonable limits on executions. In 
Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court authorized the execution of persons with mental 
retardation, in response to which many states enacted statutes exempting the 
mentally retarded from execution. The Court finally followed in Atkins v. 
Virginia. In Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, the Court author-
ized the execution of juveniles; again, states subsequently prohibited the 
practice. When the Missouri Supreme Court found that evolving standards 
of decency were offended by the execution of children, the Court followed 
suit in Simmons v. Roper.  
O'BRIEN FI PAGINATED.DOC 10/20/2006 4:00 PM 
2006] Putting the Guesswork Back 93 
 
preme Court, for example, declined to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, which found that a sentence of life without parole for 
a drug offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Michigan courts 
invalidated Harmelin’s sentence, relying on the Michigan Constitution, 
which, like that of Kansas, prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.  
The Kansas Supreme Court should also look to its neighbor to the West 
for inspiration. In People v. Young, the Colorado Supreme Court relied upon 
its own Constitution to invalidate a death penalty statute almost identical to 
the Kansas statute. The Colorado Constitution, like the Eighth Amendment, 
bans “cruel and unusual punishment.” Nevertheless, the Colorado Supreme 
Court found that “the Colorado Constitution, written to address the concerns 
of our own citizens and tailored to our unique regional location, is a source 
of protection for individual rights that is independent of and supplemental to 
the protections provided by the United States Constitution.” 
Like Colorado, Kansas has a unique history that embraces the values at 
the core of Furman and Kleypas, particularly the concern that race and class 
could influence the decision to impose the death penalty. Kansas has a 
unique history of tolerance and concern for human rights. Several of its ma-
jor population centers were founded by abolitionists from New England, 
who flocked to the territory after the Kansas-Nebraska Act put the legality 
of slavery to a popular vote when each territory applied for statehood. While 
officially nicknamed the “Sunflower State,” Kansas is proudly called the 
“Free State” by its native inhabitants, in celebration of the 1859 ratification 
of the Wyandotte Constitution, which prohibited slavery, and the subsequent 
admission of Kansas to the Union in 1861 as a free state. In 1903, the Kan-
sas legislature became one of the first in the nation to make mob lynching a 
felony offense. In 1925, Kansas became the first state to outlaw the Ku Klux 
Klan, and while some communities adopted segregation as a matter of local 
custom, Kansas never adopted Jim Crow laws. Unlike the vast majority of 
current death penalty jurisdictions, Kansas did not act quickly to reinstate 
the death penalty after Furman. Kansans have historically valued social and 
racial justice, and their constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual pun-
ishment reflects a heightened concern for human dignity.  
Justice Souter is correct that Marsh’s rule maximizing death sentences 
undoubtedly increases the risk of executing the innocent. Equally true is that 
putting guesswork back into capital sentencing is certain to exacerbate the 
existing pattern of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death pen-
alty against the poor, minorities, and other disenfranchised members of 
society. These concerns are the focus of the Eighth Amendment; the man-
date of reliability in capital sentencing has never been viewed as a 
protection for the wrongly convicted. By refusing to become the only State 
to require undecided jurors to impose death, and by continuing to insist on 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment, the 
Kansas Supreme Court can make an important stand for human decency. 
